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THE BANALITY OF WRONGFUL EXECUTIONS
Brandon L. Garrett*
Los Tocayos Carlos. By James Liebman, Shawn Crowley, Andrew Mark-
quart, Lauren Rosenberg, Lauren Gallo White and Daniel Zharkovsky. Print
version, 43 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 711, 711–1152 (2012);
online version with footnotes, available at http://www3.law.columbia.edu/
hrlr/ltc/chapter/editors-note/1.html.
Anatomy of Injustice: A Murder Case Gone Wrong. By Raymond
Bonner. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2012. Pp. xv, 283. Cloth, $26.95; pa-
per, $16.
In Doubt: The Psychology of the Criminal Justice Process. By Dan
Simon. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press. 2012. Pp. 222.
$45.
Introduction
“I didn’t do it,” said Carlos DeLuna before his 1989 execution in Texas
for a 1983 murder in Corpus Christie (Liebman et al., p. 1102). Three de-
cades after the murder, we now know that he likely did not do it. And we
know who likely really did do it. At the time, DeLuna’s execution went un-
noticed: there were no candlelight vigils, no petition drives, no international
media, and no last-minute clemency requests. DeLuna was, coincidentally,
executed in the same year that DNA testing first exonerated a convict in the
United States. Since 1989, a drumbeat of wrongful convictions has generated
headlines and captured the public imagination.1 In eighteen cases to date,
DNA tests have played a role in preventing wrongful executions of innocent
men on death row, and since the 1970s, over a hundred more death-row
inmates have been exonerated by non-DNA evidence.2 Some of those cases
have attracted real attention, but most have not.
* Roy L. and Rosamond Woodruff Morgan Professor of Law, University of Virginia
School of Law. ©
1. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent (2011). The first
DNA exonerations in the United States occurred in 1989. Id. at 181.
2. My book examined the first 250 postconviction DNA exonerations in the United
States. Id. at 5. There have now been over 310 such exonerations. Douglas A. Blackmon, DNA
Evidence Exonerates Louisiana Death-Row Inmate, Wash. Post, Sept. 29, 2012, at A03, availa-
ble at http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/louisiana-death-row-inmate-damon-thibo-
deaux-is-exonerated-with-dna-evidence/2012/09/28/26e30012-0997-11e2-afff-d6c7f20a83bf_
story.html. Damon Thibodeaux was the 300th DNA exoneree and the 18th death-row DNA
exoneree in the United States. Id. These DNA death-row exonerations alone suggest a non-
trivial exoneration rate. Far more death-row inmates have been exonerated by evidence that
was not chiefly in the form of postconviction DNA testing. The Death Penalty Information
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What is so haunting about the known wrongful convictions is that those
cases are the tip of the iceberg. Untold numbers of unnoticed errors may
send the innocent to prison—and to the death chamber. That is why I rec-
ommend to readers a trilogy of fascinating new books that peer deeper into
this larger but murkier problem. Outside the rarified group of highly publi-
cized exonerations, which have themselves done much to attract attention to
the causes of wrongful convictions, errors may be so mundane that no one
notices them unless an outsider plucks a case from darkness and holds it to
the light.
That is what happened in the Carlos DeLuna case, which drew no atten-
tion at the time and remained in near-total obscurity until Professor James
Liebman3 and a team of five law students painstakingly dissected the case in
their book Los Tocayos Carlos (the Carlos look-alikes). Their book was the
product of an in-depth investigation of the case, from the first 911 call to the
police through the execution and the evidence gathered since. They have
also published the results online, including multimedia and images of key
documents that they uncovered.4 The result is an exhaustive postmortem.
Whether political theorist Hannah Arendt was right to call Adolf Eichmann
a banal person caught up in a twisted Nazi culture that made evil seem
normal—that is another question.5 But cases like DeLuna’s show how en-
trenched failures of our criminal justice system can make the individuals
involved seem all too banal, even if some were by turns plodding, incompe-
tent, misguided, or even malicious.
In Anatomy of Injustice: A Murder Case Gone Wrong, journalist Ray-
mond Bonner6 presents a vivid account of tunnel vision gone wrong, but a
case in which the system did eventually—if only partially—right itself. Bon-
ner unravels the case against Edward Lee Elmore, a mentally retarded black
man who was sentenced to death in South Carolina in 1982 (the year before
DeLuna’s trial in Texas). Once again, the outcome was not due to one “bad
guy” but rather to a criminal justice system with practices and procedures
that, predictably, create errors that are very difficult to correct.
Center has a current count of 142 death-row inmates who have been exonerated. The Inno-
cence List, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-
freed-death-row (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). This is not an inconsequential exoneration rate, as
Professors Sam Gross and Barbara O’Brien have found by carefully modeling the false-convic-
tion rate among death sentences in both published works and works in progress. See Samuel R.
Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False Conviction: Why We Know So Little,
and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 927 (2008).
3. Simon H. Rifkind Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
4. See Los Tocayos Carlos, http://www3.law.columbia.edu/hrlr/ltc/ (last visited Oct.
29, 2013).
5. See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of
Evil (1963).
6. Investigative journalist, former foreign correspondent for the New York Times, and
former staff writer at the New Yorker. Prior to becoming a journalist, Bonner taught at the
University of California, Davis School of Law.
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While the Liebman team drills deeply into one case, Professor Dan Si-
mon’s book, In Doubt: The Psychology of the Criminal Justice Process,7 takes a
panoramic, empirical view of the larger problem (Simon, p. 1). Simon di-
gested decades of social science research into a readable and concise book.
And an important lesson emerges once the banality of wrongful convictions
is cast in the mold of cognitive research: Individual actors may not act as
“evil” villains trying to frame an innocent person. They may tend to assume
that a suspect is guilty (Simon, p. 24). Well-intentioned criminal justice ac-
tors, however, can be precisely the ones to fall prey to a guilt-bias and make
errors, particularly when working in groups in law enforcement agencies
(Simon, pp. 28–29). Ordinary tendencies to confirm prior theories, suscep-
tibility to tunnel vision, and other everyday cognitive biases may blind crim-
inal justice actors to alternative theories and entrench their views, even when
they are wrong. The fault for any one wrongful conviction does not simply
lie with a few bad actors—even malicious actors depend on the cooperation
and support of many others—but with an entire system that we must all
take responsibility for improving.
Slowly but surely, many jurisdictions have adopted important reforms
that can help prevent such miscarriages of justice. These reforms include the
following: improved eyewitness identification procedures, particularly blind
lineups; reformed interrogation practices and videotaping of interrogations;
scientific oversight of forensics; increased discovery in criminal cases; new
institutions for reviewing potential errors and claims of innocence; and
broader standards for considering newly discovered evidence of innocence
postconviction.8 After reading any one, but hopefully all three of these im-
portant books, many more will hopefully take up the call for reform.
I. Innocent and Executed
Carlos DeLuna was executed on December 7, 1989 (Liebman et al., p.
719). Los Tocayos Carlos is so detailed and exhaustive in its search for what
went wrong that readers can misapprehend that there was something inevi-
table about his ultimate execution. Yet what makes the story so powerful and
troubling is that readers are reminded each step of the way how little evi-
dence there ever was of his guilt and how contingent the rush to judgment
was that led to his execution.
The DeLuna case is particularly unsettling for two reasons. First, the
case’s near-complete “obscurity” is “a far better representation of what usu-
ally goes on” in typical criminal cases than “the facts and proceedings in
more notorious and idiosyncratic cases” (Liebman et al., p. 1116). Second, it
exposes how easy it can be to sentence someone to death: A single, shaky
eyewitness. No DNA or other forensics. No confession. Not even a murder
7. Dan Simon is the Richard L. and Maria B. Crutcher Professor of Law and Psychol-
ogy, University of Southern California Gould School of Law.
8. See Simon, pp. 45–49, 82–84, 140–42, 177–79, 203–05, 220–22; Garrett, supra note
1, ch. 9.
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weapon. The jurors must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did it, but if they never hear an alternative story, they may accept
what they are told—however flimsy—even in a death penalty case. The au-
thors conclude, “How much more evidence do we need that our system
allows the innocent to be executed?” (Liebman et al., p. 1118).
DeLuna was convicted and sentenced to death for the vicious murder of
a young woman working as a clerk at a gas station convenience store in one
of Corpus Christi, Texas’s tough neighborhoods. The victim had called the
police before she was murdered. In a chilling 911 call, she described a fright-
ening person in the store before letting out a scream. The police who even-
tually responded sent out a radio call with an eyewitness’s description of a
“Hispanic man, about 5 foot 9, wearing a flannel shirt and a gray sweat-
shirt,” seen running away from the gas station (Liebman et al., p. 737). Forty
minutes into a haphazard and confused police search of the surrounding
streets, DeLuna was found a few blocks from the crime without a shirt and
hiding under a truck (Liebman et al., p. 748). It was, as the Texas Death
House chaplain later said, a “childlike” response to hide under a truck, and
not the response of “[t]he average convict” (Liebman et al., p. 719).
DeLuna’s supposed motive was unclear. Nor was the murder clearly a rob-
bery; as the Liebman team concluded, there was at best 20 dollars missing
from the store (Liebman et al., p. 784).
The police brought DeLuna back to the crime scene to obtain an eyewit-
ness identification. There were four eyewitnesses (Liebman et al., p. 761). All
of them refused to try to identify DeLuna. With the police pleading for them
to cooperate, two eyewitnesses decided to try to identify a suspect. One
tried, but at a later preliminary hearing in the case, he was unable to identify
DeLuna (Liebman et al., p. 764). The other, who had seen the killer run out
of the store, was walked over to a patrol car surrounded by police, where
they had DeLuna shirtless and handcuffed in the backseat with flashlights
shining on him. The eyewitness was told beforehand, “We found him. Is this
the gentleman? He was hiding underneath a car” (Liebman et al., p. 761).
The police then elaborated, “[W]e found this guy hiding underneath a car
without a shirt on, two blocks north of us or three blocks north of us”
(Liebman et al., p. 765). Only after that contrived charade did the police ask
the eyewitness, “Is this the guy you seen?” (Liebman et al., p. 757). This last
eyewitness was able to identify DeLuna, and he became the central pillar
supporting the prosecution’s case.
The Liebman team excavated substantial additional evidence about this
identification procedure that had gone ignored. The eyewitness recalled,
speaking to an investigator many years later, that “[i]t was really tough, you
know,” to say “yes or no.” With the police insistent and a crowd of onlook-
ers, and since “it seemed like the right guy,” he identified DeLuna (Liebman
et al., p. 757). If it had not been for the additional information the police
gave him about having found DeLuna under a car, the eyewitness said that
his identification would have been about “fifty–fifty,” but with those re-
marks by the police, his certainty climbed somewhat higher, to 70 percent
(Liebman et al., p. 765).
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This was a terribly suggestive eyewitness identification procedure. It was
a showup—a one-on-one eyewitness identification procedure. Showups are
far more error-prone than other identification procedures since there are no
“fillers” included in addition to the suspect to better test the memory of the
eyewitness.9 Showups are typically only conducted shortly after an incident.
This one was conducted about an hour after the murder, which would have
the advantage that the eyewitness’s memory, such as it was, would still be
fresh (Liebman et al., pp. 757–59). This was, however, a showup conducted
in a gratuitously suggestive manner, with the suspect handcuffed and all the
rest.10 The eyewitness later recalled that the police “maybe tried to direct
me” by making leading comments (Liebman et al., p. 765). Social science
studies have shown that such remarks, even telling the eyewitness that the
suspect had been arrested prior to the identification procedure, increase the
rate of error.11
And it was also a cross racial identification. The eyewitness later recalled
that he had trouble with Hispanic faces, noting “[i]t’s tough . . . to identify
cross cultures” (Liebman et al., p. 765). In fact, social scientists have long
found that eyewitnesses have greater difficulty identifying individuals of an-
other race.12 A large number—almost half—of the eyewitness misidentifica-
tions in cases of DNA exonerees involved cross racial identifications.13 Each
of these troubling features of the eyewitness identification unfortunately
makes the case all too typical: showups are extremely common and poorly
regulated.14
Nor was there other evidence in the case. As is unfortunately typical, the
police did not carefully try to collect forensic evidence from the crime scene.
There was no effort to interrogate DeLuna; given DeLuna’s mental limita-
tions and how little evidence of guilt they had, it is perhaps surprising that
the police did not try to extract a confession from him.
While the jurors may have relied on the single eyewitness identification,
without hearing about how such flawed eyewitness identifications can go
wrong, they also did not hear any competing story. Prosecutors had closed
9. Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups
and Photospreads, 22 Law & Hum. Behav. 603, 630–31 (1998) (“[T]here is clear evidence that
show-ups are more likely to yield false identifications than are properly constructed lineups.”).
10. Liebman et al., pp. 757, 761–62. For examples of unnecessarily suggestive showups in
cases of DNA exonerees, see Garrett, supra note 1, at 55–56.
11. Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Eyewitness Testimony: Civil and Criminal § 4-8b
(4th ed. 2007).
12. Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race
Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 3, 5–13 (2001);
Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, The Other-Race Effect in Eyewitness Identification: What
Do We Do About It?, 7 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 230, 230 (2001).
13. Garrett, supra note 1, at 72–73.
14. For studies finding that showups are extremely common, and even more common
than prepared lineups, see Bruce W. Behrman & Sherrie L. Davey, Eyewitness Identification in
Actual Criminal Cases: An Archival Analysis, 25 Law & Hum. Behav. 475, 479 (2001), and
Richard Gonzalez et al., Response Biases in Lineups and Showups, 64 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychol. 525 (1993).
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their eyes to evidence pointing to the other Carlos—a violent man named
Carlos Hernandez who openly bragged that he had committed the murder.
Yet, the lead prosecutor called him nothing more than a “phantom” (Lieb-
man et al., pp. 956, 1002). From the moment police found him hiding,
scared, under a truck a few blocks away, DeLuna had told them, “ ‘I didn’t
do it, but I know who did.’ [DeLuna] said the same thing to his family,
friends, lawyers, prosecutors (whom he begged to give him a lie detector
test), and any member of the media who would listen” (Liebman et al., p.
1102). Liebman’s team highlights the many additional “small” pieces of evi-
dence pointing to Hernandez, including descriptions of the killer’s age,
moustache, use of a knife, and other evidence. All of that was ignored in
favor of the seemingly “big” piece of evidence: the shaky eyewitness identifi-
cation (Liebman et al., pp. 734, 981).
DeLuna’s own lawyers never claimed that he was innocent either, much
less tried to prove it. This is typical; many people later exonerated by DNA
did testify and proclaim their own innocence at trial, but their lawyers were
less than enthusiastic about repeating such claims on appeal or postconvic-
tion. Perhaps their lawyers were reluctant to claim innocence for a good
reason, since exonerees only raised successful claims of innocence after they
had obtained DNA tests.15 DeLuna’s lawyers actually told the governor of
Texas when he was considering a clemency request that “guilt was clear and
obvious” (Liebman et al., p. 1078). Moreover, the appellate and postconvic-
tion courts seemed completely unaware that the lone eyewitness identifica-
tion was deeply flawed. In affirming the conviction, the Fifth Circuit noted,
in a gross exaggeration of the evidence supporting the conviction, that
DeLuna was “seen and identified by witnesses before, during, and after the
offense.”16
The enigmatic villain of the story is Hernandez, who laughingly
thumbed his nose at the criminal justice system, which repeatedly allowed
him to escape punishment for a series of murders and other violent crimes.
But who was the legal villain in this story who should be haunted by the
ghost of an executed but innocent man? That villain is a phantom. There
was no one person to blame. The trial judge was not out to get DeLuna. The
defense lawyer at trial was far from aggressive but certainly did not act out of
spite. The prosecutors were not likely trying to frame DeLuna. The police
may not have realized how shoddy the showup identification procedures
were. Judges on appeal were likely accustomed to being highly deferential.
Nor were there multiple ill-bent masterminds all in cahoots, rubbing their
hands with delight at having executed the wrong man. It might be reassur-
ing, in a way, to think that a corrupt cop or prosecutor did this—that would
make it a bad-apple case and not just a symptom of a far larger and systemic
problem. DeLuna’s last words were, “I want to say I hold no grudges. I hate
15. See Garrett, supra note 1, at 160–61, 202–03.
16. DeLuna v. Lynaugh, 890 F.2d 720, 724 (5th Cir. 1989), quoted in Liebman et al., p.
1052.
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no one. I love my family. Tell everyone on death row to keep the faith and
don’t give up” (Liebman et al., p. 1118).
II. The Not-Exonerated
A second book, Anatomy of Injustice, is as aptly titled as the other two
(and perhaps playing off the title Anatomy of a Murder17). Like DeLuna’s
prosecution, Elmore’s saga underscores the systemic failings that can cause
the capital conviction of an innocent person. Elmore was convicted on
flimsy evidence in a hurried trial. And even in light of later evidence indicat-
ing Elmore’s innocence, he remains a convicted criminal, although he is no
longer in custody, thanks to the assistance of an indefatigable team of
lawyers.
Elmore’s case, unlike DeLuna’s, was a big deal, at least in the small town
of Greenwood, South Carolina, where the murder happened. A white, well-
to-do, elderly woman was murdered in a gruesome fashion. A frantic rush to
judgment ensued. Giving new meaning to “speedy trial,” Elmore’s trial was
fast-tracked and it was brief, with no semblance of a defense case presented
(Bonner, p. 43).
The State’s case was as skimpy as in DeLuna’s case. There was a jail-
house informant who said that Elmore confessed (Bonner, p. 70). There
were scant forensics because police botched the crime scene investigation
and did not interview a possible suspect who found the body and gave them
a tour of the crime scene (Bonner, pp. 12–14, 56). The prosecution relied
heavily on a state crime lab agent’s testimony that “forty-something of his
pubic hairs” were collected from the victim’s bed. A juror later recalled that
this was “the most convincing element in the whole trial.” Another said,
“That’s what convicted him” (Bonner, p. 193).
In fact, the crime lab agent’s testimony was unsupported by sound sci-
ence. Crime scene hairs were not DNA tested back in the 1980s. Instead,
they were compared under a microscope, and it was not possible to say that
hairs came from one person to the exclusion of all others. The most an
analyst could say was that hairs appeared “similar,” whatever that meant. I
have described a series of DNA exonerations in cases in which the prosecu-
tion presented invalid and unreliable testimony about hairs, including in
cases like Elmore’s in which multiple hairs were supposedly compared and
found to be a “match.”18 The Department of Justice is now auditing
thousands of cases from that time period in which unscientific claims were
made about hair evidence in criminal cases, including in death penalty
cases.19 Elmore was in part a victim of terribly misleading and unscientific
forensic testimony.
17. Robert Traver, Anatomy of a Murder (1958).
18. See Garrett, supra note 1, ch. 4.
19. See Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Lab’s Woes Cast Growing Shadow, Wash. Post, Dec. 23,
2012, at A01, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-22/local/36016999_1_
crime-lab-arnold-melnikoff-fbi.
986 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 112:979
Elmore was first convicted and sentenced to death in 1982. But like in so
many death penalty cases, it was only after the trial that top lawyers inter-
vened.20 Elmore had two more criminal trials, and the South Carolina Su-
preme Court reversed the judgment of each. During these years,
Elmore’s home was an eight- by ten-foot cell. It had a stainless steel toilet
and basin and a metal bed bolted to the wall; each inmate was given a
plastic mat for the bed. There was a window, about six feet high and three
inches wide. The door was solid metal, with a covered slot that would slide
open for meal trays . . . . (Bonner, p. 130)
Relentless postconviction lawyers uncovered how crucial exculpatory
forensics had been hidden. Bonner does a wonderful job of vividly explain-
ing how hard it is to raise a claim of innocence in our postconviction system
(Bonner, pp. 152–53). Instead, Elmore’s lawyers had to argue that the trial
lawyer was ineffective. They uncovered more than just missteps at trial, how-
ever. They uncovered that the jailhouse informant, who had testified three
times against Elmore, had finally “had an attack of conscience” and had
spoken to his pastor; he then admitted under oath that he had been lying all
along, in exchange for leniency from the prosecutors—and that a police of-
ficer had even placed him in Elmore’s cell so that he could “help out with
Mr. Elmore” (Bonner, pp. 162–66). They discovered that an expert, a lead-
ing pathologist, had concluded that the victim could not have been killed on
a Saturday night, as he was according to the State’s theory, and moreover
that the evidence had suggested a violent murder of the victim but no rape
(Bonner, pp. 174–75). It also emerged for the first time at a postconviction
hearing that fingerprints found at the scene did not match those of either
the victim or the defendant (Bonner, p. 191).
Finally, Elmore seemed likely to be saved by a hair. Only after Elmore’s
postconviction hearings in 1995, while still more appeals were pending, did
Elmore’s lawyers learn that the crime lab analyst had several pieces of evi-
dence—sitting in his desk for sixteen years—that he had never given to the
defense (Bonner, p. 213). The lab analyst had even testified that the items
contained no hairs; in fact, they included Caucasian hairs that did not match
Elmore’s (Bonner, pp. 215–16, 238). Not only, therefore, was the hair testi-
mony at trial scientifically invalid but, as Bonner describes, that was the least
of the problems. It emerged that no hairs were ever reported to have been
found on the victim’s bed; somehow, only after the police had yanked hairs
from Elmore’s head the morning he was arrested, were his hairs said to have
been found at the scene (Bonner, pp. 200–02). The State initially had no
evidence tying Elmore to the crime, and Bonner suggests that the police may
have sought the jailhouse informant testimony and rustled up some hairs
out of desperation.
After learning of the additional hairs in 1996, Elmore’s lawyers had
DNA tests conducted. Several of the hairs were found to be consistent with
20. James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 2030, 2074–78
(2000).
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the victim’s DNA, but one could not have come from her (Bonner, p. 236).
This Caucasian hair was obviously not Elmore’s; it belonged to some other,
unidentified man. John Blume, a law professor who argued for Elmore, told
the judge that the concealed hair “in and of itself, we believe entitles Mr.
Elmore to a new trial” (Bonner, p. 238). More bluntly, he added, “The whole
thing really stinks” (Bonner, p. 240). The judge responded that, although the
hair “should have been disclosed to counsel,” “[o]ne hair is not enough” to
justify overturning the conviction (Bonner, pp. 241–42).
With relief denied to Elmore yet again, the roller-coaster ride continued.
Bonner vividly describes each new discovery, followed by a new setback,
through the eyes of Elmore and his indefatigable team of lawyers. One can-
not read this book and view our complex system of appeals, postconviction
review, and habeas corpus review the same way. It becomes clear that al-
though serious criminal cases may receive multiple rounds of judicial re-
view, judges do not perform the kind of serious review that we might
expect. Certainly, innocence is not of significant legal concern to appellate
and postconviction judges, who are often more focused on complex proce-
dural technicalities that can prevent review on the merits—or, in the rare
cases where they reach the merits, the details of narrowly defined constitu-
tional claims. Predictably, then, the South Carolina Supreme Court denied
relief.
With an execution date set for October 2004, the prosecutors agreed to a
request to conduct more DNA tests (Bonner, p. 262). The tests uncovered
that two of the hairs were from a male individual, not Elmore, and the mate-
rial under the victim’s fingernails did not match Elmore’s DNA profile. The
tests also uncovered, however, that spots of blood on Elmore’s shoes and
blue jeans matched the victim’s blood (Bonner, pp. 272–73). Meanwhile, in
2007, a psychological evaluation concluded that Elmore “meets the diagnos-
tic criteria for mental retardation” and was therefore ineligible for execution
(Bonner, p. 275). His death sentence was vacated, after twenty-seven years,
but he was still facing a life sentence in prison (Bonner, pp. 277–78).
Elmore remains a convicted felon to this day. But Bonner’s book has an
epilogue. A federal appeals court granted Elmore a new trial, citing “persua-
sive evidence that the agents were outright dishonest” concerning the foren-
sics.21 The court described how hairs, and not just blue fibers, should have
been readily apparent to the naked eye and how the fingerprint evidence was
misreported as unidentifiable.22 The court called Elmore the “victim” of “in-
ept and corrupt law enforcement officers unchecked by incompetent defense
counsel.”23 The dissenter on the Fourth Circuit accused his colleagues of
21. Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783, 870 (4th Cir. 2011), quoted in Bonner, p. 279.
22. Id. at 870–71. For a description of similar failures to disclose exculpatory forensics in
cases of people later exonerated by DNA testing, as well as similar assertions that potentially
highly probative and exculpatory forensics were inconclusive, see Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J.
Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2009).
23. Elmore, 661 F.3d at 872.
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entertaining a “fanciful conspiracy,”24 which was perhaps unsurprising—
that dissenting judge had written a prominent opinion rejecting relief for a
Virginia death-row inmate, Earl Washington, Jr., who was later cleared by
postconviction DNA tests.25 Heartened by this dissent, the State seemed
poised to continue to appeal the order of a new trial.
The content of the epilogue was itself not the end of the story. In yet
another turn of events, shortly after Bonner’s gripping book was published,
Elmore was permitted to plead guilty to a lesser crime (without admitting
guilt).26 After 11,000 days in prison, he is free but not exonerated.27 This
does not at all take away from the power of Bonner’s book, particularly
given the lack of a complete exoneration or vacatur of the conviction, in
spite of the new evidence of Elmore’s innocence. Perhaps the attention di-
rected to Elmore’s case due to the publication of Bonner’s book played some
role in securing his freedom. In contrast, it is too late for Carlos DeLuna,
whose case remained swept under the rug until researchers unearthed it de-
cades later.
III. Accuracy in Doubt
The third in this trilogy of recent inquiries into criminal injustice ac-
complishes a truly Herculean feat of synthesis, rather than focusing on a
single case. Dan Simon digests decades of psychological research exploring
why wrongful convictions may go unnoticed. In some areas, there are liter-
ally thousands of social science studies as well as meta-analyses—often in
psychological journals that lawyers may never come across—but, prior to
Simon’s book, a single, comprehensive roadmap to that social science re-
search simply did not exist. A book like this, which highlights the most au-
thoritative and relevant work, is an invaluable resource for lawyers and
scholars.
Simon does far more than digest decades of social science work, how-
ever. He uses that work to highlight the reasons why everyone involved in
the criminal justice system, from police, prosecutors, and defense lawyers to
judges and jurors may make mistakes—even when they have the best inten-
tions. Although wrongful convictions can happen because there were “delib-
erate efforts to distort the truth,” Simon correctly focuses on the everyday
work of criminal justice actors who “seek to fulfill their roles honestly and
dutifully” (Simon, p. 10). Errors may be the product of everyday cognitive
bias. Police may want to be supportive of witnesses trying to help solve cases
24. Id. at 876 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting), quoted in Bonner, p. 279.
25. Washington v. Murray, 4 F.3d 1285 (4th Cir. 1993); Maria Glod, Former Death-Row
Inmate Would Get $1.9 Million, Wash. Post (Mar. 28, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/27/AR2007032702240.html.
26. Associated Press, Mentally Disabled Inmate Goes Free After 30 Years as a Single Strand
of Hair Grants Him the Right to a Retrial on 1982 Murder Charge, MailOnline, http://www.
dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2109357/Mentally-disabled-inmate-goes-free-30-years-single-
strand-hair-gives-retrial-murder-charge.html (last updated Mar. 2, 2012).
27. Id.
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or may wish to “jog” the witnesses’ memories, so they ask leading questions,
display the suspect standing alone, or tell eyewitnesses that the suspect will
appear in the lineup, and they congratulate eyewitnesses on a job well done
when they pick the suspect (Simon, pp. 111–13). Seemingly innocuous sug-
gestions, however, can transform a shaky eyewitness into a confident one—
even if he in fact picked an innocent man (Simon, pp. 75, 114–15). Police
and prosecutors may succumb to “tunnel vision” and ignore evidence con-
tradicting the narrative they have built up around a suspect (Simon, p. 24).
Errors may escalate and take on a life of their own.
Moreover, as Simon carefully notes, plea bargaining dominates the
criminal justice system, but it “does not readily lend itself to psychological
experimentation” (Simon, p. 10). Although this is not the theme of his
book, Simon highlights that the same flaws in criminal investigations and
evidence development can and do affect plea negotiations.
What can prevent cases like DeLuna’s from going wrong? Simon pains-
takingly reviews reforms at each stage of the criminal investigation process.
It is not enough to conduct a lineup using best practices. As soon as possible
after a crime, police officers and prosecutors must carefully interview indi-
vidual witnesses separately and in a nonleading way (Simon, p. 118). All
such evidence should be recorded and documented (Simon, p. 118). Trial
judges should serve as careful gatekeepers for the evidence, particularly eye-
witness identifications, confessions, and other types of evidence that might
be highly unreliable and misleading if obtained through flawed procedures
(Simon, p. 178). Wrongful convictions of the high-profile variety have en-
couraged more legislators, policymakers, law enforcement officials, prosecu-
tors, and courts to adopt these much-needed improvements (Simon, pp.
220–22). Simon carefully shows how each recommended reform flows from
social science research.
Why have these changes been so slow in coming? As Simon describes,
cognitive bias is an everyday phenomenon, even among people working
“honestly and dutifully,” and it does not provide an evil villain to blame and
punish (Simon, p. 10). While decades of social science research suggest clear
improvements to the practices used in eyewitness identifications and inter-
rogations, as well as to other common investigative tools, these improve-
ments have slowly been adopted in our fragmented and slow-moving
criminal justice system.28 Cases like DeLuna’s and Elmore’s suggest how it
may be very hard to correct the ingrained habits of our criminal justice
system without larger changes to the incentives and structure of the system.
28. For a description of the pace of adoption of such reforms, see Garrett, supra note 1,
ch. 9. For a case study in the pace of adoption of eyewitness identification procedure reforms
in Virginia, see Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitness Identifications and Police Practices: A Virginia
Case Study, 3 Va. J. Crim. L. (forthcoming 2014), manuscript available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2313908.
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Conclusion
These three books share a deep connection to each other and to other
works on what causes wrongful convictions. Social science researchers are
increasingly interested in studying criminal investigations and procedures,
particularly at the state and local levels, where reforms have been adopted in
response to high-profile exoneration cases. After studying the path-breaking
social science research that Simon marshals, cases like Elmore’s are not sur-
prising. Nor is DeLuna’s case surprising, especially after familiarizing oneself
with the decades of research on cases of eyewitness error and the tunnel
vision that can set in during murder investigations.
Other death-row exonerations share such forms of flawed evidence. The
evidence that contributed to the convictions and sentences of the eighteen
people sentenced to death but later exonerated by DNA testing is telling.29
Eight of those cases involved false confessions, and in each of those cases, the
person was said to have confessed in detail. Those false confessions were
each presented to the jury as statements including details that only the true
culprit supposedly could have known. The jurors thought that they were
hearing the words of the actual killer.30 Ten of the eighteen death penalty
cases involved testimony by informants.31 The informants may have been
unsavory characters trying to earn leniency, but they claimed to have over-
heard confessions with details that only the culprit could have known. Nine
of the cases involved eyewitness identifications, as in DeLuna’s case.32 Four-
teen of the death penalty cases involved forensic evidence, including cases
with unreliable forensics. Ten of the cases involved hair comparisons, and
29. See supra notes 1–2.
30. These figures update the discussion in Garrett, supra note 1, at 257, to include the
Thibodeaux case noted supra note 2, which involved a false confession and an eyewitness
misidentification. The eight death-row exonerees who had falsely confessed were Rolando
Cruz, Alejandro Hernandez, Ronald Jones, Robert Miller, Damon Thibodeaux, Earl Washing-
ton, Jr., Ronald Williamson, and Nicholas Yarris. An appendix that describes the details re-
ported to have been present in the confessions is available at Brandon L. Garrett,
Characteristics of Exoneree False Confessions, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, http://www.law.vir-
ginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/convicting_the_innocent/garrett_false_confessions_appendix.pdf
(last visited Nov. 17, 2013). For information concerning Damon Thibodeaux’s confession, see
Know the Cases: Damon Thibodeaux, Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
Content/Damon_Thibodeaux.php (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
31. The death-row exonerees who had informants of various types testify at their trials
were Kirk Bloodsworth, Rolando Cruz, Charles Fain, Alejandro Hernandez, Verneal Jimerson,
Ryan Mathews, Curtis McCarty, Dennis Williams, Ronald Williamson, and Nicholas Yarris. An
appendix that describes the details reported to have been present in the confessions is available
at Brandon L. Garrett, Characteristics of Informant Testimony in DNA Cases, Univ. of Va. Law
Sch., http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/convicting_the_innocent/garrett_infor-
mants_appendix.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
32. The death-row DNA exonerees who had eyewitness testimony at their trials were
Kirk Bloodsworth, Alejandro Hernandez, Ronald Jones, Ryan Mathews, Frank Lee Smith, Den-
nis Williams, Ronald Williamson, and Nicholas Yarris. An appendix that describes the eyewit-
ness testimony in those and other DNA exoneree cases is available at Brandon L. Garrett,
Characteristics of Eyewitness Misidentifications in DNA Exonerees’ Trials, Univ. of Va. Law
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two involved fiber comparisons. Nine involved serology, or blood typing.
Two involved bite mark comparisons.33 That forensic evidence was often
presented in an unscientific and exaggerated way, as in the Elmore case,
made it seem very powerful to jurors. Only one of the death-row DNA ex-
onerees received any relief from a federal court prior to obtaining DNA test-
ing—Ronald Williamson, who received DNA testing and was exonerated
after a federal judge granted his habeas corpus petition.34
There are straightforward ways to prevent irreversible errors, including
better lineups, improved police investigations, videotaped interrogations, ro-
bust discovery, and gatekeeping by judges. Courts in New Jersey and Ore-
gon, for example, have recently issued high-profile decisions revamping
standards for regulating eyewitness identifications in the courtroom.35 More
and more jurisdictions have adopted interrogation reforms. Some prosecu-
tors have created “conviction integrity units” designed to review possible
errors.36 Although there are more such efforts across the country each year,
it may take high-profile wrongful convictions to push us further toward get-
ting it right.
I note one more development, ongoing in the months that these books
were published: the National Registry of Exonerations, a collaboration be-
tween Professor Samuel Gross of the University of Michigan Law School and
the Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern University Law
School, was established.37 DNA exonerations are only a small part of the
Registry’s collection of cases, which now includes well over 1,000 exonera-
tions, the vast bulk of which have never attracted significant notice before.
Some of those people may well be guilty, but they were all exonerated, and it
is not every day that courts reverse convictions on the basis of new evidence
Sch., http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/convicting_the_innocent/garrett_eyewit-
ness_appendix.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). In addition, Damon Thibodeaux was misiden-
tified by two eyewitnesses. See Innocence Project, supra note 30.
33. The death-row DNA exonerees who had forensic testimony at their trials were
Michael Blair, Kirk Bloodsworth, Kennedy Brewer, Rolando Cruz, Charles Fain, Alejandro
Hernandez, Verneal Jimerson, Ronald Jones, Ray Krone, Curtis McCarty, Robert Miller, Den-
nis Williams, Ronald Williamson, and Nicholas Yarris. In addition, Earl Washington, Jr., had
serology evidence concealed from the defense, and Ryan Mathews was excluded by DNA tests
presented at his trial. An appendix that describes the forensic testimony in these cases and that
in the others of the first 250 DNA exoneree trials is available at Brandon L. Garrett, Forensic
Testimony, Univ. of Va. Law Sch., http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/convict-
ing_the_innocent/garrett_forensics_appendix.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2013).
34. Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D. Okla. 1995), aff’d sub nom. Wil-
liamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1997).
35. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673 (Or.
2012).
36. Ctr. on the Admin. of Criminal Law, Establishing Conviction Integrity
Programs in Prosecutors’ Offices (2012), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/de-
fault/files/upload_documents/Establishing_Conviction_Integrity_Programs_FinalReport_
ecm_pro_073583.pdf.
37. National Registry of Exonerations, Joint Project of Mich. Law & Nw. Law, https://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). I note
that I am now a member of the advisory board of the Registry.
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of innocence. We simply do not know how many innocent people languish
behind bars or how many were improperly or unfairly sentenced to terms
that they do not deserve. We have only begun to try to keep count.
Our judicial system does not normally conduct inquiries when miscar-
riages of justice occur. It is left to the outsiders and the obsessives, journal-
ists and academics, social scientists and postconviction lawyers—a diverse
group of which I am privileged to count myself a member—to try to metic-
ulously pick up the pieces. Liebman’s, Bonner’s, and Simon’s books each
bring some daylight and understanding to the reasons why our criminal
justice system so often makes terrible mistakes. They provide powerful re-
sources for lawyers and reformers trying to improve our criminal justice
system. They also provide something quite rare: a clearer understanding of
what went wrong. The only way to truly do justice to this remarkable trilogy
of new books is to ask you to read each of them.
